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given the second semester. Both courses are required for second-
year students enrolled under the four-year law course.
Mr. Arno C. Becht, who was last year a member of the faculty
of the University of Georgia School of Law, has been appointed
Assistant Professor of Law for 1940-1941. Mr. Becht will teach
courses in Labor Law, Sales, and Legislation, and will also act
as Faculty Advisor to the Washington University Law Quar-
terly.
The Law School has for the academic year 1940-1941 a total
enrollment of 158, with an entering class of 58. Of the entering
students, fourteen are taking the four-year law course which was
initiated last year for those students presenting only two years
of college work. The three-year law curriculum continues for
the benefit of those students having a degree or presenting at
least three years of college credit.
The total number of bound volumes in the Law Library has
now reached 52,106, including some very welcome gifts received
during the past year.
NOTES
GARNISHMENT IN MISSOURI-CONFLICT OF
LAWS PROBLEMS*
In this paper the term "garnishment" will be used to desig-
nate a proceeding against an intangible money debt as distin-
guished from a proceeding against tangible property. The pri-
mary problems in a garnishment proceeding when the facts pre-
sent a conflict of laws situation are jurisdictional. The question
most difficult to answer appears in a dual aspect: what facts
must concur before the forum will have such jurisdiction of the
persons and property involved that due process of law require-
ments will be met, and that the judgment will be entitled to full
faith and credit in other states? A second problem arises out
of the various jurisdictional difficulties: How can the interests
of the garnishee and the principal debtor best be protected in
the garnishment proceeding?
I
As related to garnishment proceedings the term "jurisdiction"
has two distinct connotations. The first of these relates to what
* This note follows in general the outline of problems considered in
Kennedy, Garnishment of Intangible Debts in New York (1926) 85 Yale
L. J. 689, to which the present writer is indebted.
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may be called the statutory formalities of jurisdiction as, for ex-
ample, service of summons and of notice of garnishment, and
the return on the writs. These statutory formalities must be
complied with to acquire jurisdiction. As to this phase of juris-
diction, it should be noted that proceedings by garnishment were
unknown to the common law-the remedy is purely statutory.1
This aspect of garnishment is not considered in this paper.
The second connotation of "jurisdiction" in garnishment pro-
cedure involves numerous complications depending on classifica-
tion of the nature of a garnishment proceeding. Garnishment
has at different times been classified by courts as a proceeding
in personam and as a proceeding in rem. These possible classi-
fications involve two problems: First, is a court which enter-
tains a proceeding by garnishment to treat it as a proceeding
in rem or a proceeding in personam? Second, to what extent
must a court consider jurisdictional requirements that are essen-
tial in order that its rendition of a judgment be entitled to full
faith and credit in another forum? Although this classification
must be based primarily on an analysis of judicial decisions,
legislation may give some aid. The text of the Missouri statute
provides:
All persons shall be subject to garnishment, on attach-
ment or execution, who are named as garnishees in the writ,
or have in their possession goods, moneys or effects of the
defendant not actually seized by the officer, and all debtors
of the defendant, and such others as the plaintiff or his at-
torney shall direct to be summoned as garnishees.-
The problems to be considered here are those which concern
the second phase of jurisdiction; namely, jurisdiction based on
classification of the nature of the procedure.
When the forum is confronted with a simple bi-partite action,
the problems of jurisdiction in relation to classification find
comparatively easy solution. In order to give a valid judgment
against the defendants in an action in personam, as a general
rule the forum needs to bring the parties before the court by
personal service within the state.3 In certain exceptional in-
1. In Trinidad Asphalt Mfg. Co. v. Standard Oil Co. (1924) 214 Mo.
App. 115, 121, 258 S. W. 64, it was said: "Attachment proceedings being
in derogation of the common law and wholly the creation of statutory law,
the courts have no general jurisdiction thereof but only such special and
limited jurisdiction as is given by statute. Such a statute is exclusive, and
in order to acquire jurisdiction thereunder the particular mode designated
by statute must be strictly followed * * *."
2. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 1396. See also R. S. Mo. (1929) secs. 1278,
1291, 1296.
3. The case most frequently cited for this point is Pennoyer v. Neff
(1877) 95 U. S. 714.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol26/iss1/14
stances constructive service by publication may be permitted in
a proceeding in personam.4 On the other hand, if the action be
in rent, a court need only secure control over the particular thing
located within the geographical limits of the forum and then
give some reasonable type of notice to warn its owner to pro-
tect his rights.5
However in the tri-partite garnishment procedure, the essen-
tials of jurisdictional prerequisites become more involved and
perplexing. The fundamental problems of jurisdiction based on
classification of the nature of the proceeding are the same as
in a simple bi-partite action. But the introduction of a third
party (hereafter called garnishee), who owes money to a prin-
cipal debtor, complicates classification of the procedure as one
strictly in rem or in personam, and so tends to blur the deter-
mination of those formalities of jurisdiction with which there
must be compliance.6
The first possible classification of garnishment is that it may
be treated as a proceeding in personam, that is, an action di-
rected against either the garnishee or the principal debtor, or
both, personally. The objective of an in personam action is the
recovery of a personal judgment which may be satisfied out of
the general assets of the defendant or defendants. This line of
reasoning cannot consistently be followed in garnishment, in as
much as the real purpose of the procedure is to reach a particu-
lar asset, consisting of the chose in action represented by the
debt owed to the principal debtor by the garnishee. As to the
garnishee the recovery sought is in personam since its aim is
an adjudication that he is indebted to the principal debtor and
that such debt be reduced to judgment in favor of the plaintiff,
and satisfies out of the garnishee's general assets. However, as
to the plaintiff, the garnishment proceeding is also an attempt
to establish his debt against the principal debtor, and to satisfy
that claim by an attachment of the property represented by the
4. For example, in some states if the party to be served is domiciled
within the forum; if he has given actual consent (consent in fact) to such
service; if he has impliedly consented by the doing of such acts within the
forum as the court will hold equivalent to consent. The latter class is
illustrated by the non-resident motorist statutes. In connection with this
matter see Dodd, Jurisdiction in Personal Actions (1929) 23 Ill. L. Rev. 427.
5. Again, this notice must conform to the concept of due process of law.
See Arndt v. Griggs (1889) 134 U. S. 316, affirming the dictum of Pennoyer
v. Neff on this point.
6. The person who brings the garnishment will be referred to as the
plaintiff; the person who is summoned as garnishee will be termed the
garnishee; and the person who owes a debt to the plaintiff and to whom
the garnishee owes a debt will be referred to as the principal debtor.
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intangible debt owed to the principal debtor by the garnishee.
In view of this analysis garnishment cannot accurately be classi-
fied as a procedure strictly in personam.
The second possible classification of garnishment is as a pro-
ceeding in rem, that is, a proceeding directed against the in-
tangible thing which consists of the debt owed by the garnishee.
Since this is the fundamental purpose of garnishment, the ques-
tion arises whether the proceeding is entirely in the nature of
an action in rem so that the presence of the intangible res within
the territorial limits of the forum gives the court power to
render a valid judgment, regardless of the lack of presence and
personal service upon the principal debtor7 But the same con-
siderations advanced in the preceding paragraph indicate, also,
that garnishment cannot accurately be described as a proceeding
strictly in rem.
In some cases courts have attempted to classify garnishment
under the hybrid designation, quasi-in-rem. This classification
is misleading since, in effect, it begs the question. Garnishment
is actually an in rem proceeding as to the principal debtor and
an in personam proceeding as to the garnishee. Hence, to desig-
nate garnishment a proceeding quasi-in-rem is incorrect unless
the term is intended to imply that it partakes of the nature of
both. And if that be intended, it would appear that the proper
thing to do is to analyze the procedure into its in rem and in
rpersonam segments rather than to imply that there exists a
distinct third classification, quasi-in-rem.
When a plaintiff proceeds by attachment against tangible prop-
erty of the principal debtor, found in the hands of a third party,
there is little difficulty in regard to jurisdiction based on classifi-
cation of the nature of the proceeding. The proceeding is in
rem and a court may exercise jurisdiction over a tangible res
found within the territorial confines of the forum. In garnish-
ment also the plaintiff is seeking to collect his claim, but, instead
of proceeding against tangible property, he brings his action
against a garnishee, and bases it upon the circumstance that
the principal debtor has owed to him an intangible debt.
Now by definition, an intangible is a chose in action or credit
of some kind which is incapable of having an actual physical
location; it is merely a legal concept. But in dealing with in-
tangibles, for various jurisdictional purposes courts have found
it useful to ascribe a situs to the property right and have re-
7. This discussion pertains only to situations in which the principal
debtor has been served by publication and has not appeared.
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sorted to legal fictions to express that result." Garnishment is
not the only situation in which an intangible will be treated as
if it had an actual physical presence at some particular place,
and in several situations the useful situs fiction may be used to
give the same intangible location at several distinct places. Thus
for purposes of taxation an intangible may be treated as having
its location at the domicil of the creditor ;9 for intestate succes-
sion it may have its situs at the domicil of the -debtor ;'0 or, in
some cases, it may be considered as embodied in a document
which is evidence of the debt.", The rulings of the courts in
these matters depend upon considerations of convenience.
Commercial necessity has called for practical treatment of
problems raised in garnishment procedure. As a step toward a
practical result courts have reified the debt; but, for jurisdic-
tional reasons which will be indicated, only the intangible debt
owed by the garnishee has been so taken as a res. In order to
deal judicially with the fictional res, the second necessary step
has been to ascribe to it a situs for garnishment purposes.
Some courts ascribe to a debt a situs at the domicil of the
creditor on the theory that it is a valuable thing in his hands.
Others affix a situs at the domicil of the debtor, on the theory
that a debt is a res in the debtor's hands, belonging to the credi-
tor. Still others draw a further distinction in cases where, by
the terms of the contract creating it, the debt is payable at a
specified place; that place is by them considered the situs of the
debt for garnishment purposes, without regard to the domicil
of either debtor or creditor. Having determined a situs for the
reified debt owed by the garnishee to the principal debtor, the
court may proceed according to the statutory provisions for an
in rem proceeding. But the plaintiff also seeks a personal judg-
ment against the garnishee and, as to the garnishee, the pro-
ceeding is governed by the jurisdictional requirements of an in
personam proceeding.
8. The authorities differ as to the situs of intangibles. See: Carpenter,
Jurisdiction Over Debts (1918) 31 Harv. L. Rev. 905; 1 Beale, Conflict of
Laws (1st ed. 1935) 455-458, sec. 108.1. For opinions in accord with the
maxim, mobilia non habent situm, see Story, Conflict of Laws (8th ed.
1883) 507-516, secs. 362-369; Wallace v. McConnell (U. S. 1839) 13 Pet.
136; Rio Grande R. R. v. Gomila (1889) 132 U. S. 478; American Bank v.
Rollings (1868) 99 Mass. 313; Trowbridge v. Means (1845) 5 Ark. 135;
Renier v. Hurlbert (Wis. 1891) 50 N. W. 783.
9. Kirtland v. Hotchkiss (1879) 100 U. S. 491; Boyd v. Selma (1891)
96 Ala. 144, 11 So. 393, 16 L. R. A. 729; Davenport v. Mississippi Ry.
(1861) 12 Iowa 539; Potter v. Ross (1852) 23 N. J. Law 517; In re Bron-
son (1896) 150 N. Y. 1, 44 N. E. 707, 55 Am. St. Rep. 632, 34 L. R. A.
238.
10. Beale, op. cit. supra, note 8, at 456, sec. 108.1.
11. Note (1914) 1 Va. L. Rev. 553.
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The case of Harris v. Balk, 2 decided by the United States
Supreme Court in 1904, is the leading case in the United States
on the problem of garnishment. In that case Harris, a resident
of North Carolina, was indebted to Balk (also a resident of
North Carolina) and Balk was indebted to Epstein, a resident
of Maryland. While Harris was temporarily in Maryland, Ep-
stein attached the debt owed to Balk by Harris, in accord with
the procedure of the state. Upon trial of the cause, Harris con-
sented to the entry of an order of condemnation against him for
the amount of his debt to Balk and paid the judgment. Balk
then sued Harris in North Carolina on the latter's debt and
Harris pleaded the Maryland judgment in bar of recovery. The
North Carolina court held that the Maryland judgment was not
entitled to full faith and credit since the Maryland court had
no jurisdiction to enter the judgment. The basis of the deci-
sion was that Harris was served with process when he was but
temporarily in Maryland and that the situs of the debt for gar-
nishment purposes remained in North Carolina, his domicil.
Upon review in the United States Supreme Court judgment
was reversed for Harris, the Court holding that the Maryland
tribunal had jurisdiction so that its judgment was entitled to
full faith and credit. The Court said:
If there be a law of the State providing for the attachment
of the debt, then if the garnishee be found in that State,
and process be personally served upon him therein, we think
the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over him, and can
garnish the debt due from him to the debtor of the plaintiff
and condemn it, provided the garnishee could himself be
sued by his creditor in that State. * * * If, while tempora-
rily there, his creditor might sue him there and recover the
debt, then he is liable to process of garnishment, no matter
where the situs of the debt was originally.13
Thus in Harris v. Balk the Supreme Court disregarded the
theories under which some courts had considered the fictional
situs of a debt as localized at the domicil of either the debtor
or the creditor and, for the purpose of the full faith and credit
clause, adopted the rule that an intangible could be garnished
wherever the plaintiff obtained personal service on the garnishee,
provided that the principal debtor could have sued him for the
same intangible in such forum.
The precise issue of constitutional law raised in Harris v.
Balk was that of the full faith and credit required, under the
12. (1904) 198 U. S. 215.
13. Harris v. Balk (1904) 198 U. S. 215, 222.
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Federal Constitution, to be given by North Carolina to the sister-
state garnishment judgment of Maryland. This in turn hinged
on the question of due process of law in the procedure leading
up to the Maryland judgment. The Supreme Court decision is
authority for no more than that personal service of a garnishee
temporarily within the forum may constitute the basis for juris-
diction over the debt-res. In reaching this decision the Court
rejected the views that an intangible debt has its situs at the
domicil of either the debtor or of the creditor for the purpose
of garnishment and this dictum has proved highly persuasive to
state courts, although it is not binding upon them.
II
In view of the tri-partite nature of a garnishment proceeding,
there are several possible fact situations which may exist in
cases presented to a state court for adjudication. In the event
that all the parties are domiciled in the forum, no problem of
conflict of laws is presented. In such cases the plaintiff merely
follows the statutory procedural requisites to secure jurisdiction,
the primary phase of jurisdiction indicated at the beginning of
this note. In the following situations, however, conflict of laws
problems may arise: (1) when the garnishee is domiciled in the
forum and the principal debtor is not; (2) when the principal
debtor is domiciled in the forum and the garnishee is not; (3)
when neither the garnishee nor the principal debtor is domiciled
in the forum. These situations will be considered in the order
above stated. It will be noted, however, that the domicil of the
plaintiff is not material in determining jurisdiction based on the
classification of the nature of the procedure in these situations,
since his presence in the forum is essential to bringing the action
in the first place.
(1) When the Garnishee Is Domiciled in Missouri and the
Principal Debtor Is Not
The earliest case involving the problem presented when the
garnishee is a resident of Missouri and the principal debtor is a
non-resident throws no particular illumination on the problem.
In Lackland v. Garesche,'1 in which the resident garnishee was
a trustee of property for a non-resident cestui, the principal
debtor, the court held merely that the plaintiff had mistaken his
remedy in seeking to garnish trust property. Hence, no recov-
ery was allowed.
The case of Wabash Western Railway v. Siefert'- also gives
14. (1874) 56 Mo. 267.
15. (1890) 41 Mo. App. 35.
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but little help. In this case the plaintiff appealed to the Missouri
courts to enjoin the defendant from prosecuting certain actions
in Illinois courts in which plaintiff had been summoned as gar-
nishee by the defendant. In deciding this case for the plaintiff
the court again said nothing about the nature of garnishment
jurisdiction, and merely held that Missouri courts could take
jurisdiction and issue an injunction against the parties' pro-
ceeding fraudulently in a foreign forum.
In the early cases involving the garnishment of debts in a
conflict of laws situation, the St. Louis Court of Appeals treated
the action as a proceeding in rem. By resorting to the fiction
of the situs of intangibles, the court decided that it had juris-
diction over the res and, consequently, power to render a valid
judgment. In the first of these cases, Fiedler v. Jessup,6 all
the parties-plaintiff, garnishee, and principal debtor-were
residents of Illinois. Suit was brought in the St. Louis Court
of Appeals to collect a debt allegedly owed the plaintiff by the
Missouri agent of the garnishee. The court stated the law as
follows:
A proceeding by garnishment is not in the nature of a
personal action against the garnishee.* * *
It is evident that a debt, like all other property, must have
a situs somewhere.17
The court then proceeded to consider the different theories ad-
vanced by other jurisdictions concerning situs of a debt in gar-
nishment and concluded that, in line with New England author-
ity", and in opposition to stated New York authority,0 the sitis
of an intangible should be held to be at the domicil of the debtor
for purposes of garnishment, although it might be at the domicil
of the creditor for other purposes. As an exception to this gen-
eral rule the court also stated that, when a debt was expressly
made payable at a named location, the place of payment should
be considered to be its situs for garnishment.20 Since both prin-
cipal debtor and garnishee were domiciled in Illinois and no
other place of payment was specified, the situs of the debt under
any theory was considered as being in Illinois, and beyond the
jurisdiction of the forum. Therefore the attempted garnishment
failed.
16. (1887) 24 Mo. App. 91.
17. Fiedler v. Jessup (1887) 24 Mo. App. 91, 93-94.
18. E. g., Tingley v. Bateman (1813) 10 Mass. 343; Lovejoy v. Albee
(1851) 33 Me. 414, 54 Am. Dec. 630; Sawyer v. Thompson (1852) 24 N. H.
510.
19. E. g., Osgood v. McGuire (1875) 61 N. Y. 524; Williams v. Inger-
soll (1882) 89 N. Y. 508.
20. Accord, Walker v. Fairbanks & Co. (1893) 55 Mo. App. 478.
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The following year the St. Louis Court of Appeals in the case
of Todd v. Missouri Pacific Railway2s affirmed the dictum of the
Fiedler case that when a debt is payable in a state other than
the forum, Missouri courts have no in rem jurisdiction in a pro-
ceeding of garnishment.
In Keating v. American Refrigerator Co., 22 decided the same
year, the court adhered to its prior concept of the situs of a debt
for in rem jurisdiction in garnishment, saying:
The decisions in this state * * * [hold] that the situs of the
debt is the place where the debtor resides, unless the debt
by the terms of the contract is payable elsewhere; and in
the latter event, such situs is at the place where the debt
is payable.2 3
However, as authority supporting the decision, the court cited
Williams v. Ingersoll,24 a New York case, for the concept of in
rem. jurisdiction in garnishment based on the situs of an in-
tangible at the domicil of the debtor. The court did not notice
that only one year before, in the Fiedler case, the same decision
had been cited by the same court as authority for the concept
that in rem jurisdiction in garnishment requires that intangibles
be considered as having a situs at the domicil of the creditor.
Up to this time there had been no case decided in the Supreme
Court of Missouri which considered the problem of jurisdiction
from the standpoint of classification of garnishment as a pro-
ceeding in ren or in personam. The problem was, however,
raised by the case of Wyeth Hardware & Manufacturing Co. v.
H. F. Lang & Co.,25 wherein the supreme court laid down the
rule that still obtains in Missouri concerning the situs of a debt
for purposes of garnishment. The supreme court in effect
adopted the decision of the Kansas City Court of Appeals in the
same case,26 and that decision is considered here.
The facts of the Wyeth case were those considered principally
under this subdivision, that is, where the garnishee is domiciled
in the forum and the principal debtor is domiciled in another
state. As will appear in the statement of facts, the garnishment
forum here was not Missouri. However, in deciding the case,
the supreme court found it necessary to consider the question
21. (1888) 33 Mo. App. 110.
22. (1888) 32 Mo. App. 293.
23. Keating v. American Refrigerator Co. (1888) 32 Mo. App. 293, 297.
24. (1882) 89 N. Y. 508.
25. (1895) 127 Mo. 242, 29 S. W. 1010, 27 L. R. A. 651, 48 Am. St.
Rep. 626.
26. Wyeth Hardware & Mfg. Co. v. H. F. Lang & Co. (1893) 54 Mo.
App. 147.
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of jurisdiction in garnishment based on the nature of the proce-
dure and the situs of an intangible for garnishment purposes.
In that case, A brought an action in the Missouri courts to re-
strain B from enforcing judgments rendered in a garnishment
action in Kansas. A, a resident of Missouri and the principal
debtor, had been notified by publication in Kansas and evidently
had not appeared before the court; the garnishees were domiciled
in Kansas. A's claim before the Missouri court was that B
should be enjoined from enforcing the Kansas judgment inas-
much as he, A, had been served only by publication in that pro-
ceeding and thus that the Kansas court had acquired no juris-
diction to return the judgments in issue. The Kansas City Court
of Appeals held that when the forum has jurisdiction in per-
sonam over the garnishee by personal service and over the prin-
cipal debtor by publication, for purposes of garnishment, the
forum may take jurisdiction of the res, namely, the debt which
the resident garnishee owes to the non-resident principal debtor.
In its opinion the court said:
Contracts respecting personal property and debts are now
universally treated as having no situs or locality; and they
follow the owner in point-of right. They are deemed to be
in the place and are disposed of by the law of the domicile
of the owner wherever in point of fact they may be situate
in accordance with the maxim mobilia non habent situm
* * *. It has been ruled in effect that a debt without refer-
ence to where payable is deemed attached to the person of
the owner so as to have its situs at his domicile, yet this
fiction always yields to laws for attaching the property of
a non-resident because such laws necessarily assume that
the property has a situs distinct from the owner's domicile.
Wherever the creditor might maintain a suit to recover the
debt there it may be attached as his property, provided the
laws of such place authorize it.27
The court then stated that it disagreed with the holding of the
St. Louis Court of Appeals in the Keating and Fiedler cases,
insofar as those decisions held that the situs of a debt is where
it is to be paid when the contract creating it makes it payable
at a particular place. The net result of the Wyeth case was that
Kansas had jurisdiction in its action in rem since the situs of a
debt for garnishment purposes is in the person of the debtor
wherever he may be, as long as he could be sued on the debt
by his creditor in that place.
27. Id. at 153.
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As stated, the supreme court on appeal affirmed the decision, 28
adopting the portion of the opinion quoted above, and said that
in its judgment the quoted language was supported by the weight
of authority and reason.29
In the case of Dinkins v. Crunden-Martin Co.,30 A, a resident
of Missouri, recovered a judgment against B, a resident of Mis-
sissippi. Because B could not be reached for execution, A gar-
nished a salary due B from C, who was B's employer and who
was a resident of Missouri, that is, A sought, in Missouri, to have
B's salary applied in satisfaction of A's judgment. The St. Louis
Court of Appeals, without mention of its prior holdings in the
Fiedler and other cases discussed above, cited the Wyeth case
as authority for the proposition that the court had jurisdiction
of the cause, even though the debt was payable in Mississippi,
and though the principal debtor did not appear. However, in a
later case, Smith-Premier Typewriter Co. v. National Cash
Register Co., 31 where the facts were similar to those involved
in the Dinkins case, the St. Louis Court of Appeals refused juris-
diction, basing its refusal on the fact that the garnishee actually
owed nothing to the non-resident principal debtor. But the court
quoted with favor an excerpt from the opinion in McCord &
Nave Mercantile Co. v. Bettles:32
A court has no jurisdiction over the debtor as a party when
he has been merely notified by publication and has not
heeded the notice. It has jurisdiction over the property
brought into court, and over that only. The jurisdiction of
the court in such cases depends upon whether there is a res
upon which it can act.33
The court also cited with favor the recognition in the McCord
case that garnishment is in the nature of, but not strictly, a
proceeding in rem.
It cannot be argued that the St. Louis Court of Appeals here
or the Kansas City Court of Appeals in the McCord case was
28. Wyeth Hardware & Mfg. Co. v. H. F. Lang & Co. (1895) 127 Mo.
242, 29 S. W. 1010, 27 L. R. A. 651, 48 Am. St. Rep. 626.
29. Accord: Howland v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. (1896) 134 Mo. 474,
36 S. W. 29; Western Stoneware Co. v. Pike County Mineral Springs Co.
(1913) 172 Mo. App. 696, 155 S. W. 1083; Hartung v. Northwestern Mut.
Life Ins. Co. (1913) 174 Mo. App. 289, 156 S. W. 981; State ex rel. Leahy
v. Barnett (1915) 193 Mo. App. 36, 180 S. W. 458; Farrar v. American
Express Co. (Mo. App. 1919) 219 S. W. 989; Ralston Purina Co. v. King
(1937) 101 S. W. (2d) 734.
30. (1903) 99 Mo. App. 310, 73 S. W. 246.
31. (1911) 156 Mo. App. 98, 135 S. W. 992.
32. (1894) 58 Mo. App. 384.
33. McCord & Nave Mere. Co. v. Bettles (1894) 58 Mo. App. 384, 387.
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advancing the theory that by its nature garnishment must neces-
sarily involve personal service on or voluntary appearance of
the principal debtor, since by Missouri statutes it is provided
that service by publication may be had in garnishment.3 4 It is
submitted that both courts were in fact announcing the theory
that personal service on or appearance of the principal debtor
is not necessary. Proper personal service on and presence of the
garnishee is sufficient if he holds "effects and credits of the
defendant principal debtor" since such service and appearance
confers jurisdiction on the court over the res. This also implies,
of course, that jurisdiction based on compliance with all of the
statutory formalities exists in such suit. Thus, although a per-
sonal judgment cannot be rendered as against the principal
debtor in such a case, a judgment as against debts owing to him
by the garnishee may be valid.
Regarding the facts typified in this first section, where the
garnishee is domiciled in Missouri and the principal debtor is
not, it appears that the Missouri Supreme Court subscribed to
the rule which was to be adopted ten years later by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Harris v. Balk. In determining
jurisdiction by classification of the nature of the procedure, the
lower Missouri courts in their early decisions felt that the pro-
ceeding was strictly in rem, with the situs of the debt as the
determining factor in finding this type of jurisdiction. In line
with this theory the lower courts held that the sits of a debt
for garnishment purposes was at the domicil of the debtor, un-
less the contract made it payable at some other place. Later,
however, in the Wyeth case, the Missouri Supreme Court recog-
nized that for some purposes garnishment sounds in personam.
Hence, the Missouri Supreme Court laid down the Missouri rule
for this type of case by holding that garnishment would lie
against the garnishee, regardless of his domicil, in any forum
wherein he might have been sued by the principal debtor. Thus,
in effect, the procedure is now held to be in personam as to the
garnishee and in rem as to the debt due from the garnishee to
the principal debtor.
(2) Where the Principal Debtor Is and the Garnishee Is Not
Domiciled In Missouri
The problem of garnishment jurisdiction when the principal
debtor is and the garnishee is not domiciled in Missouri presents
fewer complications than the situation previously considered.
34. R. S. Mo. (1929) sees. 739, 748, 2436.
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Although there are no recorded cases in which a non-resident,
temporarily in Missouri, has been summoned as garnishee, it is
submitted that jurisdiction in such a case would be primarily
a matter of compliance with the statutory formalities. In order
to have jurisdiction over the garnishee in this situation, the court
must require personal service of the garnishee within the geo-
graphical limits of the forum. -A failure to have such personal
service would prevent the court from acquiring jurisdiction ac-
cording to the statutory formalities, and any judgment rendered
against the garnishee without such service would be coram non
judice. Orthodox principles of due process at common law as
well as due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution require such service.35 If the statutory pre-
requisites to jurisdiction are satisfied, under the theory of the
Wyeth case there would be no question of jurisdiction based on
classification of the nature of the proceeding. The forum would
have in personam jurisdiction over the garnishee by personal
service and, under the Wyeth case, would also have in rem juris-
diction over the intangible brought under control of the court
by reason of the garnishee's presence in the forum. Hence per-
sonal service on the garnishee would not only secure valid juris-
diction of both types but would also make the proceeding one of
internal law rule as opposed to conflict of laws.
(3) Where Neither the Garnishee Nor the Principal Debtor
Is Domiciled In Missouri
As indicated above,35 the leading case in the United States on
the problems of garnishment is Harris v. Balk. That case dealt
with the situation where neither principal debtor nor garnishee
is domiciled in the forum. There is no reported Missouri case
on all fours factually with the situation involved in the Harris
case, nor is there a Missouri case in which one temporarily in
Missouri has been summoned as a garnishee, either when the
principal debtor resided in Missouri or was himself a non-resi-
dent. From the reported cases, however, certain predictions can
be made as to the probable result if such case should be brought.
The closest factual analogy to Harris v. Balk found in the Mis-
souri reports is the case of Palmer v. Bank of Sturgeon.37 How-
ever, here the analogy fails in one vital particular, which will
be shown in a review of the case.
In the Palmer case, A, a resident of Tennessee, had a claim
35. Pennoyer v. Neff (1877) 95 U. S. 714.
36. See page 90, supra.
37. (1920) 281 Mo. 72, 218 S. W. 873.
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against B, a resident of Missouri. C, also a resident of Tennes-
see, was indebted to D, a Missouri banking corporation. B had
a certain sum of money on deposit in D bank. By a proceeding
in Tennessee, A tried to reach B's deposit in the Missouri bank
by serving C with process in Tennessee. B and D were served
by publication. B did not appear but D appeared without object-
ing to the jurisdiction of the Tennessee court and admitted its
debt to B. The court then held that B was indebted to A; that C
was indebted to D bank, which in turn was indebted to B; and
that the debt of C to D be applied in payment of the claim of A
against B. C then paid A the amount C owed to D. When B
later sued D in Missouri for the amount B had on deposit, D
pleaded the proceedings and judgment of the Tennessee court.
The Missouri court gave decision in favor of B, holding that B
was not bound by the Tennessee proceeding, since jurisdiction
over C could not give the Tennessee court the right to reach a
debt owed by D to B. Also the voluntary appearance of D in
Tennessee was held not to give the court jurisdiction over the
debt D owed to B.3 1
From the opinion of the court come the following quotations:
"No sovereignty can extend its powers beyond its own ter-
ritorial limits to subject either persons or property to its
judicial decisions. Jurisdiction must be founded either upon
the person of the defendant being within the territory of the
sovereign where the court sits, or his property being within
such territory; for otherwise there can be no sovereignty
exerted, upon the known maxim, extra territoriam jus
dicente impune non paretur.* * "39
Also:
"The established general rule is that any personal judg-
ment which a state court may render against one who did
not voluntarily submit to its jurisdiction, and who is not a
citizen of the State, nor served with process within its
borders, no matter what the mode of service, is void, be-
cause the court had no jurisdiction over his person. ' '40
It might seem that the decision in this case is contrary to the
decision in the Wyeth case regarding jurisdiction by classifica-
tion of the nature of the proceeding in garnishment, although
the Wyeth case was nowhere mentioned either by counsel or by
38. See Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Mo. Annot. (1937) sec. 108.
39. Palmer v. Bank of Sturgeon (1920) 281 Mo. 72, 87, 218 S. W. 873.
The court here quotes its opinion in the case of Smith v. McCutcheon (1866)
38 Mo. 415.
40. Palmer v. Bank of Sturgeon (1920) 281 Mo. 72, 88, 218 S. W. 873.
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the court. In the Palmer case, a non-resident garnishee appeared
in Tennessee and permitted entry of judgment against himself,
and the Missouri court refused to give full faith and credit to
the decision on the grounds that the Tennessee court had neither
in personam jurisdiction over the principal debtor, nor in rem
jurisdiction over the debt owed by the garnishee to the princi-
pal debtor. However, it is submitted that the language of the
opinion shows a clear distinction between the holding of the
Palmer case and the general rule in Missouri as stated in the
Wyeth case. The very fact that the Wyeth case was not men-
tioned in the opinion in the Palmer case suggests that the facts
called for the application of a different rule of law. The court
apparently was impressed by the plaintiff's contention that, al-
though jurisdiction over C, the Tennessee debtor of D bank,
gave the court jurisdiction to garnish debts due from C to a non-
resident, nevertheless the court did not have the further power
to reach a debt that one non-resident owed to a second non-resi-
dent to whom C was indebted.41 This holding conforms to the
rule in Harris v. Balk and in the Wyeth case. Those cases held
that personal jurisdiction over the garnishee gave the court juris-
diction over the debt he owed to the principal debtor. But the
Palmer case refused to extend the rule to a case in which one
garnishment is superimposed on another, that is, where the
garnishee against whom recovery is sought is twice removed
from the principal debtor, on whose debt plaintiff bases his right
to recover. 42
Apparently the court also felt that the voluntary appearance
of the garnishee in this situation will not supply the jurisdiction
otherwise lacking. Although no concrete explanations for this
holding appear in the opinion, a number of reasons suggest them-
selves. First, there is a general antipathy toward permitting the
Tennessee court to acquire formal jurisdiction under a statute
which runs in the face of Missouri's general rules in regard to
such jurisdiction as stated above in the quotation from the opin-
ion. The court said further:
"* * * Even, therefore, should a legislature of a state ex-
pressly grant such jurisdiction to its courts [that is, juris-
diction in this type of service of the garnishee by publica-
41. See also Wilson v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. (1891) 108 Mo. 588, 18
S. W. 286; Norvell v. Porter (1876) 62 Mo. 309; New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Dunlevy (1916) 241 U. S. 518; Douglass v. Phenix Ins. Co. (1893) 138
N. Y. 209, 20 L. R A. 118, 34 Am. St. Rep. 448.
42. The Palmer case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
but was there dismissed for want of jurisdiction in a memorandum opin-
ion. Bank of Sturgeon v. Stanley Palmer (1922) 258 U. S. 603.
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tion] over persons or property not within its territory, such
grant would be treated elsewhere as a mere attempt at
usurpation, and all judicial proceedings in virtue of it held
utterly void for every purpose." 43
Furthermore, there is a strong caveat from a practical stand-
point against permitting such service to give a court power to
render a valid judgment in garnishment. By such a holding pos-
sible collusion between a plaintiff and a garnishee might place
the trial of the cause in a forum geographically remote from
the domicil of the principal debtor, making his appearance for
defense difficult, if not impossible. Also, through such collusion,
the plaintiff and the garnishee might defraud the principal
debtor by selecting a forum whose peculiar holdings would at-
tach liability to the principal debtor which he might avoid in
other jurisdictions.
Were it not for the fact that the Wyeth case upheld the juris-
diction of a foreign court in relation to a Missouri principal
debtor, it might forcibly be urged that by its decision in the
Palmer case the Missouri court showed a policy to protect Mis-
souri citizens from the harassment of foreign garnishments,
since there a Missouri principal debtor was relieved from the
effect of a foreign garnishment. It may be that this principle
underlies the case since possible hardships to a Missouri prin-
cipal debtor would undoubtedly be magnified beyond reasonable
proportions if the holding of the Tennessee court were sanc-
tioned.
To complete the study of garnishment problems in the hypo-
theses under consideration, it is necessary to discuss the situa-
tion in which a foreign corporation, doing business in Missouri,
is summoned as garnishee for debts owed to the principal debtor,
inasmuch as the statutes make the rule in such cases different
from that which obtains when the garnishee is merely an indi-
vidual resident of some state other than Missouri. The Missouri
statute states that:
Every corporation for pecuniary profit formed in any
other state, territory or country, before it shall be author-
ized or permitted to transact business in this state, or to
continue business therein if already established, shall have
and maintain a public office or place in this state for the
transaction of its business, where legal service may be ob-
tained upon it * * *; and such corporation shall be sub-
jected to all the liabilities, restrictions and duties which are
or may be imposed upon corporations of like character or-
43. Palmer v. Bank of Sturgeon (1920) 281 Mo. 72, 87, 218 S. W. 873.
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ganized under the general laws of this state, and shall have
no other or greater powers."
It apparently is the intention of the Missouri legislature that,
for purposes of garnishment, foreign corporations doing busi-
ness in Missouri shall have a status analogous to that of domestic
corporations, since they may be served locally through agents
which they are required to maintain within the state. Hence, as
regards garnishment, these cases involve no conflict of laws
principle. By the statutes and the prescribed service the require-
ments of in rem and in personam jurisdiction for the different
purposes of garnishment are also met. In this connection, it
should be observed that the statutes show a strong legislative
policy to aid Missouri citizens who seek to summon foreign cor-
porations doing business in Missouri as garnishees and to avoid
giving foreign corporations a more favorable position when so
summoned than domestic corporations have. In regard to the
situs for garnishment purposes of a debt owed by a foreign cor-
poration doing business in Missouri and summoned as a garni-
shee, it appears that the maintenance of the agents required by
statute brings the credits within the control of the forum in a
garnishment proceeding. Hence, the court has in rem jurisdic-
tion over these credits.45
III
The principle underlying Harris v. Balk and its Missouri cor-
relative, the Wyeth case, results in the elimination of only a
part of the fiction which surrounds the treatment of garnish-
ment, and many problems remain to be considered. Before any
rule of garnishment can be considered just and proper it must
satisfy reasonably well the needs of commercial control at the
forum without unreasonable interference with the legitimate in-
terests of another state, primarily that of the principal debtor.
The change in the rule of the situs of a debt set forth in Harris
v. Balk illustrates one aspect of the situation, for that decision
met the crying need for a concept of a debt which did not stop
at state lines, arising from the ever increasing interstate char-
acter of business transactions. 6 But more is required of the rule
44. R. S. Mo. (1929) secs. 4596, 4597.
45. St. Louis Perpetual Ins. Co. v. Cohen (1845) 9 Mo. 421; McAllister
v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co. (1859) 28 Mo. 214; John Swallow v. Duncan &
Gregory (1885) 18 Mo. App. 622; Western Assurance Co. v. Walden (1911)
238 Mo. 49, 141 S. W. 595; Hartung v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co.
(1913) 174 Mo. App. 289, 156 S. W. 980; Farrar v. American Express Co.
(Mo. App. 1919) 219 S. W. 989; Kurre v. American Indemnity Co. (1929)
223 Mo. App. 406, 17 S. W. (2d) 685.
46. Kennedy, Garnishment of Intangible Debts in New York (1926) 35
Yale L. J. 689.
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if justice is to be done. In the balance of interests between the
forum and the other states, a rule which does not go very far
in preventing the subjection of the garnishee to possible double
liability and in protecting the principal debtor from the fraud
of the other parties cannot be considered satisfactory, no mat-
ter what its efficacy when judged by the standards of the forum.
A judgment against the garnishee and the payment thereof
will not serve as a bar to recovery against him in a subsequent
action on the debt by the principal debtor unless the court in
the garnishment proceedings has jurisdiction to render the
judgment.47 It is therefore extremely important for his own
protection that the garnishee determine whether the court may
properly be said to have jurisdiction. This determination is com-
plicated by the fact that both requisites of jurisdiction, that is,
compliance with the statutory formalities and correct treatment
of the procedure as in rem or in personam, must be met before
full faith and credit is required to be given to the judgment
under Harris v. Balk.
In one important portion of its opinion bearing upon the prob-
lem of possible double liability in Harris v. Balk the court said,
by way of dictum:
But most rights may be lost by negligence, and if the
garnishee were guilty of negligence in the attachment pro-
ceeding, to the damage of Balk [principal debtor], he ought
not to be permitted to set up the judgment as a defense.
Thus it is recognized as the duty of the garnishee to give
notice to his own creditor, if he would protect himself, so
that the creditor may have the opportunity to defend him-
self against the claim of the person suing out the attach-
ment. * * * we think it [want of notice to principal debtor
by garnishee] has and ought to have an effect upon the right
of the garnishee to avail himself of the prior judgment and
his payment thereunder. This notification by the garnishee
is for the purpose of making sure that his creditor shall
have an opportunity to defend the claim made against him
in the attachment suit. Fair dealing requires this at the
hands of the garnishee.48
As to this passage it is possible that the court may not have con-
sidered fully the practical aspects of a garnishment proceeding.
It cannot be presumed that the ordinary party served in a gar-
nishment case will realize the existence of so onerous a burden.
47. Pulitzer Publ. Co. v. Current News Features, Inc. (C. C. A. 8, 1938)
94 F. (2d) 682; Palmer v. Bank of Sturgeon (1920) 281 Mo. 72, 218 S. W.
873.
48. Harris v. Balk (1904) 198 U. S. 215, 227.
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Possibly he may have no reasonable means of locating and noti-
fying the principal debtor. Other difficulties are illustrated by
several fact situations."9
In the Palmer case, the garnishee was not served personally
but only by publication. He appeared, admitted the debt, and
paid the resulting judgment. In a later action by the principal
debtor against the garnishee, the former judgment was held not
to bar recovery, because the statutory requirements for juris-
diction in the earlier suit had not been met. Apparently it was
felt that the failure of the garnishee to object to the jurisdiction
of the court in the first suit was such want of due diligence as
to justify his being held doubly liable.
Or, again, A sues to garnish C's debt to B. C is served per-
sonally, but no service, either personal or by publication, is had
on B. C admits the debt and pays the judgment. When B later
sues C on the debt, it has been held that the first judgment will
not bar recovery by B.50
And finally, A sues to garnish C's debt to B and both parties
are served properly. B has a defense against A which if raised
would bar recovery. C, however, does not urge the defense,
either from lack of knowledge thereof or from lack of due dili-
gence. B does not appear. In this case hardship is inevitable.
Either B will later be permitted to recover in an action against C,
thus burdening C with double liability, or B will be denied re-
covery, thus putting the loss on him.
Prior to the decision in Harris v. Balk there existed the absurd
possibility that one state might deny full faith and credit to a
judgment valid where rendered, merely because of conflicting
concepts of the situs of the debt and, therefore, of jurisdiction.
This result is no longer possible as long as the theory of the
court hearing the garnishment proceeding coincides with that
set forth in the Harris case, since that case held such a judgment
49. The following cases illustrate failure of jurisdiction in garnishment
actions. They are not used to illustrate the exact point involved, but are
cases where, if the jurisdictional objection had not been made, there might
have been a double liability assessed against the garnishee on the grounds
that the judgment was no bar to an action by the principal debtor against
the garnishee. Smith-Premier Typewriter Co. v. National Cash Register
Co. (1911) 156 Mo. App. 98, 135 S. W. 992; Jenkins Sons Music Co. v.
Sage (1914) 184 Mo. App. 340, 171 S. W. 672; Riley Pa. Oil Co. v. Sym-
mons (1916) 195 Mo. App. 111, 190 S. W. 1041; Kilroy v. Briggs (1918)
198 Mo. App. 240, 200 S. W. 436; Federal Truck Co. v. Mayer (1924) 216
Mo. App. 443, 270 S. W. 408; State ex rel. Shaw State Bank v. Pfeffle(1927) 220 Mo. App. 676, 293 S. W. 512; Vittert v. Melton, Sieberling
Rubber Co. (Mo. App. 1935) 78 S. W. (2d) 467; Milliken v. Armour &
Co. (1937) 231 Mo. App. 662, 104 S. W. (2d) 1027.
50. Johnson Mach. Co. v. Watson (1894) 57 Mo. App. 629.
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entitled to full faith and credit. However, Harris v. Balk pre-
sents no satisfactory solution of the problem of double liability,
as presented in the fact situations noted above, since a judgment
may always be impeached for lack of jurisdiction of the issuing
tribunal. Under these circumstances it seems a better approach
to prevent, insofar as possible, the occurrence of double liability,
than to rationalize it after it has become inevitable by branding
as negligence an inadvertent error of the garnishee who, in the
language of the decisions, is supposed to be uninterested in the
outcome of the suit.
Of course the rule in Harris v. Balk extends no protection to
the garnishee outside the boundary lines of United States author-
ity. Foreign countries may therefore refuse to grant recogni-
tion to judgments valid under the jurisdictional concepts of
Harris v. Balk. Before such a forum, the payment by the gar-
nishee of a valid United States judgment might be no defense
to a subsequent action brought against him by the principal
debtor. Thus a further aspect of the problem of double liability
is presented.
The second major difficulty in the application of the rule of
Harris v. Balk and of the Wyeth case operates against the inter-
ests of the principal debtor. Inasmuch as the principal debtor
has no control over the whereabouts of his debtor he may be
confronted with a garnishment proceeding brought in a juris-
diction geographically remote from his home. The cost and
trouble of defense as compared to the size of the debt in issue
might compel the principal debtor to permit judgment against
himself by default, although if the action had been brought
nearer home he might have interposed a valid defense.
The principal debtor may have a valid defense against the
plaintiff but through lack of actual notice he may not appear
at the garnishment proceedings. The garnishee may not know
of the defense and, admitting his debt, may pay the judgment.
If the garnishee is allowed to plead the payment in bar to a
subsequent action against him by the principal debtor, it will
be seen that the problem of double liability has been solved only
at the expense of the principal debtor.
Various writers have suggested various devices to cure or
at least ameliorate the harsh results here outlined. For example,
Professor Beale has advocated the French procedure of Saisie
Arret.51 This action consists of the issuance of an injunction
51. Beale, op. cit. supra, note 8, at 466, sec. 108.5; Beale, The Exercise
of Jurisdiction in Rem to Compel Payment of a Debt (1913) 27 Harv. L.
Rev. 107.
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against payment by the garnishee of his debt to the principal
debtor. Thereafter suit is brought by the plaintiff against the
principal debtor, wherever he may be found, and if judgment
is recovered it is satisfied by payment into the court which is-
sued the injunction, of the debt owed by the garnishee to the
principal debtor. Professor Beale states that this substitute for
garnishment proceedings could be adopted in the United States
by legislation, and suggests an act of Congress.
Professor Holt5 2 suggests that the Federal Interpleader Act 3
might be the basis for a possible solution, at least in cases where
a non-resident corporation is summoned as garnishee in a state
where it is doing business.
A note in the Yale Law Journal-- suggests a policy which ap-
pears to have great merit, at least from the standpoint of ex-
pediency. The note states that since only the plaintiff stands to
gain from a garnishment, he alone should bear the burden of a
possible loss. This, the note submits, could be simply achieved
through a statute requiring the plaintiff in a garnishment action
to post a bond to indemnify the garnishee against possible double
liability.
CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions to be drawn from a study of Missouri cases
on the conflict of laws of garnishment may be summarized as
follows:
1. In the early cases the courts emphasized those character-
istics of garnishment which led to its classification as an in rem
proceeding.
2. Under this view jurisdiction was conditioned by the theory
of the situs of the debt. This situs was held to be at the domicil
of the debtor or at the specified place of payment.
3. Beginning with the decision in the Wyeth case, Missouri
became one of an increasing number of states to adopt the rule
which was expressed ten years later by the United States Su-
preme Court in Harris v. Balk; namely, that garnishment will
lie whenever the garnishee is personally served in any forum
in which the principal debtor could have brought an action
against him on the debt. It would seem that the Wyeth case
laid down a general rule, applicable to any fact-situation of the
conflict of laws of garnishment.
52. Holt, The Federal Interpleader Act and Conflict of Laws in Garnish-
ment (1937) 4 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 403.
53. (1936) 49 Stat. 1096, 28 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1939) sec. 41 (26).
54. Note (1939) 48 Yale L. J. 690.
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4. Thereafter the Missouri cases have consistently classified
the garnishment of intangible debts as a proceeding in personam
in relation to the garnishee, and as a proceeding in rem in rela-
tion to the principal debtor.
5. A rule of garnishment, such as that laid down in Harris v.
Balk must reasonably meet the needs of the forum with respect
to commercial control, without undue interference with legiti-
mate interests of other states. But it must go further. Some
means must be found to protect the interests of the principal
debtor, and to guard against the possibility of double liability
of the garnishee, which is inherent in the dictum in Harris v.
Balk. On this phase of the problem there are no Missouri cases.
Of the suggested solutions, it is submitted that a statute requir-
ing the plaintiff to post a bond indemnifying the garnishee and
the principal debtor against possible loss has the greatest merit.
RALPH T. SMITH.
PERSONAL DISQUALIFICATIONS OF ADMINISTRATORS*
At early common law there were no statutes governing the
selection of the administrator of a decedent's estate.' Today in
all American states, 2 as well as in England,3 there are statutes
* Part II of this note, dealing with judicial disqualifications of adminis-
trators, will appear in the next issue of the Quarterly.
1. 3 Schouler, Wills, Executors and Administrators (6th ed. 1923) 1671,
sec. 1389.
2. Ala. Code (1928) secs. 5730, 5742-5745; Ariz. Rev. Code (1928) secs.
3922-3925, 3992; Ark. Digest of Statutes (Pope's 1937) c. 1, secs. 7-9, 15;Cal. Probate Code (1937) c. 4, art. 1, secs. 420-426, art. 2, sec. 442; Colo.Comp. Laws (1921) secs. 5222, 5228; Conn. Gen. Stats. (1930) sec. 4904;
Del. Rev. Code (1935) secs. 3808-3810; Fla. Comp. Laws (1927) secs. 5521-5526; Ga. Code (1933) c. 113, sees. 1202-1204; Idaho Code (1932) tit. 15,
sees. 312-328; Ill. Smith-Hurd Ann. Stats. (1934) c. 3, see. 18; Ind. Burns
Stats. (1933) tit. 6, sees. 301-304; Iowa Code (1935) secs. 11883, 11884,12066; Kan. Gen. Stats. (1935) c. 22, secs. 312, 328; Ky. Carroll's Stats.
Ann. (1936) secs. 3845, 3896; La. Civil Code (1932) sees. 1042-1046; Me.
Rev. Stats. (1930) c. 76, secs. 18, 25, 27; Md. Ann. Code (1924) art. 93,
secs. 15-29, 53; Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) c. 193, secs. 1, 2; Mich. Comp.
Laws (1929) secs. 15586, 15595; Minn. Mason's Stats. (Supp. 1936) secs.8992-68; Miss. Code (1930) sees. 1629, 1630, 1642; R. S. Mo. (1929) sees.6-10, 43, 47; Mont. Rev. Code (1935) secs. 10068-10073; Neb. Comp. Stats.(1929) c. 80, secs. 314, 323; Nev. Comp. Laws (1929) secs. 9637-9641;
N. H. Pub. Laws (1926) c. 299, secs. 2-10; N. J. Rev. Stats. (1937) tit. 3,
c. 7, sec. 6; N. M. Stats. Ann. (1929) c. 47, art. 1, secs. 109-111; N. Y.
Thompson's Laws (1939) Surrogate's Court Act, secs. 94, 118; N. C. Code(1935) secs. 6-15; N. D. Comp. Laws (1913) secs. 1657, 8663; Okla. Stats.(1931) sees. 1135-1149; Ore. Code Ann. (1930) tit. 11, sees. 208-210, 231;Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page's 1926) tit. 3, c. 3, sees. 10629, 10636, 10617,(Supp. 1926-1935) secs. 10509-3; Pa. Purdon's Stats. (1936) tit. 20, secs.
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